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Attachment to
IAC-D-103/2
11 May 1956

United States
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Washington 25, D. C.

April 13, 1956

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

At the request of the Department of State, other Government agencies, and individuals, the AEC has considered the matter of U. S. -Soviet exchange of visits.

The AEC has no objection to visits by AEC and AEC-contractor personnel, and other persons of interest to AEC, to Soviet-bloc countries, under controlled arrangements, for purposes of participating in conferences, as members of official delegations, or as individuals, provided:-

a. There continues to be a reasonable expectation of net gain; and

b. Considering any family ties abroad and the degree of access to sensitive weapon or national defense information, such travel does not appear unwise from the standpoint of national security or the personal safety of the traveller.

The AEC has no objection, if such visits cannot be discouraged and cannot be avoided, to Soviet-bloc nationals visiting non-security areas of AEC installations and activities at:-

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- a. Brookhaven National Laboratory
- b. Argonne National Laboratory
- c. University of California Radiation Laboratory,
Berkeley
- d. Argonne Cancer Research Hospital
- e. Universities performing unclassified
AEC projects -

- and will not object to Soviet-bloc nationals contacting AEC and AEC-contractor personnel under controlled arrangements, provided there is evidence of initial and continued reciprocity, and provided there continues to be reasonable expectation of net gain to the U. S.

Requests by Soviet-bloc countries for extended visits by, or employment of, their nationals at AEC installations and activities, or extended visits by, or employment of, AEC and AEC-contractor personnel in Soviet-bloc countries, will not be authorized without specific approval by the Commission.

In addition to the position set forth above, it is the view of the AEC that final responsibility with respect to the desirability of, and the handling of, scientific personnel interchange rests with the Department of State, but that responsibility with respect to technical and professional qualifications of AEC and AEC-contractor personnel involved in such interchange, as well as control of visits to AEC installations and activities, should rest with the AEC.

The Department of State has been advised of the AEC position as set forth above. We have assured the Department of State, and wish to assure the Central Intelligence Agency, of our full and complete cooperation with respect to any problems or matters arising in connection with the anticipated interchange of personnel with Soviet-bloc countries.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ K. E. Fields
General Manager